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DISCOVERY EXAMINATION BEFORE
TRIAL-HISTORY, SCOPE,
AND PRACTICE
RicHARD A. MCDERMOTT

D

URING the first years following the entrance of Wisconsin into
the Union of the States, there began the slow evolution of the
then common law and equity practice into the present forms and
modes. In 1858 the legislature of the state began the codification of
the examination of a party to an action by the adversary, extending its
scope and revising the manner of procedure. That the benefits of this
highly remedial statute are much sought is evidenced by one of the
observations made in the course of a recent survey of Milwaukee
County Courts. Depositions taken pursuant to it were used in 84 per
cent of the trials observed in the period from December 1, 1933 to
March 22, 1934.1 This has been the case since it was first enacted, if
one may judge from the number of times in which the court of last
resort has passed upon its various phases.
The scope of this article will be strictly confined to a study of the
discovery statute, Sections 54 and 55, Chapter 137, of the Revised
Statutes, 1858, as amended to its present form, Section 326.12, Wisconsin Statutes, 1935. To do otherwise would serve but to tax the
limitations of these short pages, and inject problems interesting but not
germane to it. But to do so necessitates pruning to almost skeleton form
many legal questions which arise in its application to practical situa-

I Congestion in the Milwaukee Circuit Court

(1935) 9 Wis. L. REv. 321, 333.
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tions. It may be of interest to note that the Wisconsin court has been
called upon to consider and rule upon this section well over one hundred
times from Volume 18 of the Wisconsin reports down to the present.
It has been amended no less than eighteen times by the legislature and
twice by the supreme court, under its rule making power, since it first
appeared among the statutes of this state.
For the sake of convenience and order, the statutory section, in two
forms, appears below. 2 Prior to the year 1907, Section 326.12 (then

Section 4096) consisted of but one paragraph. That year and thereafter
the section was subdivided and numbered; and in 1909 the sections
were denominated as well. In the year 1927 the section was revised pursuant to Section 43.08 (2) and re-enacted [c. 523, §49, Wis. Laws
(1927)] in substantially its present form. Therefore, it may be noted
that to the left is a composite statute including the various amendments
adding to and dropping therefrom portions of the original enactment;
and to the right appears Section 326.12, as amended twice, by court
rule, as noted therein. Hereafter no reference will be made to the section as it was evolved; for by reference to the citation and then to the
statute its form existing at any one time may be ascertained, if so desired by the reader.
For three score years and more following the enactment of this
statute its first phrase carried the expression of the legislative intent. It
abolished the old bill of discovery and substituted therefor a new
remedy. 3 Both form and substance of the old bill were done away
with 4 ; and it was not limited in its application to cases in which the old
bill might have been had.' It was not limited to discovery of facts
which could not be proven by other witnesses or evidence." It is in the
nature of a cross-examination 1 ; and its scope may be as broad as on
cross-examination." The purpose of the statute is to elicit a full and
2See Appendix infra.
3 Whereatt v. Allis, 65 Wis. 639, 27 N.W. 630 (1886) ; Frawley v. Cosgrove, 83
Wis. 441, 53 N.W. 689 (1892) ; Hughes v. C. St. P. M. & 0. R. Co., 122 Wis.
258, 99 N.W. 897 (1904); State v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 132 Wis.
345, 112 N.W. 515 (1907) ; RohIeder, guardian ad litem v. Wright, 162 Wis.
580, 156 N.W. 955 (1916); Northern Wisconsin Co-operative Tobacco Pool
v. Oleson, 191 Wis. 586, 211 N.W. 923 (1927).
4 Whereatt v. Allis, 65 Wis. 639, 27 N.W. 630 (1886) ; Frawley v. Cosgrove, 83
Wis. 441, 53 N.W. 689 (1892).
5 Kelly v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 60 Wis. 480, 19 N.W. 521 (1884) ; Meier
v. Paulus, 70 Wis. 165, 35 N.W. 301 (1887) ; Richards v. Allis, 82 Wis. 509,
52 N.W. 593 (1892).
Meier v. Paulus, 70 Wis. 165, 35 N.W. 301 (1887); Rohleder v. Wright, 162
Wis. 580, 156 N.W. 955 (1916).
7 Cleveland, Ex'rs. v. Burnham, 60 Wis. 16, 17 N.W. 126, 18 N.W. 190 (1884);
Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. A. Spiegel Co., 155 Wis. 201, 144 N.W. 272
(1901).
- Cleveland, Ex'rs. v. Burnham, 60 Wis. 16, 17 N.W. 126, 18 N.W. 190 (1884);
Kelly v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 60 Wis. 480, 19 N.W. 521 (1884); Nichols
v. McGeoch, 78 Wis. 360, 47 N.W. 372 (1890).
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complete disclosure of whatever may be relevant to the controversy. 9
This is to be ascertained if the pleadings are in, by the issues so made,""
if after complaint is served, by the allegations therein-; or if before
any pleadings are served by the order granting it (under the statute as
3
it then existed) 2 or as at present, by the affidavit made therefor13
Being a remedial enactment it should be liberally construed." But
it will not be given a construction beyond its evident scope and purpose
so as to confer rights not intended to be conferred by it. It contemplates a broader and more extensive field of investigation than does
Section 269.57, Wisconsin Statutes, 1935, providing for an inspection
of books and records. The object of its use is the obtaining of evidence by the party taking it from the persons examined.' The proceedings serve to lessen the expense of litigation and remove embarrassments in the way of a bona fide prosecution of legal rights. The party
may find that he has no grounds for relief and may thus avoid expensive litigation. For this reason its use ought not to be unduly hampered or restricted." In this respect it has been held that where a
plaintiff has had the benefit of an examination of his adversary he must
be deemed to have come to trial expecting to meet the precise claims
which the proof tended to establish."
Although the discovery statute abolished the old bill of discovery,
yet it was held that it did not affect the jurisdiction of equity to entertain an action for an accounting; and where a discovery is a necessary
part of the accounting the jurisdiction of equity is unquestionable.20
However, where the complaint alleged on information and belief
9 Kelly v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 60 Wis. 480, 19 N.W. 521 (1884) ; Meier
v. Paulus, 70 Wis. 165, 35 N.W. 301 (1887) ; State v. Baetz, et al, 86 Wis. 29,
56 N.W. 329 (1893) ; Schmidt v. Menasha W. W. Co., 92 Wis. 529, 66 N.W.
695 (1896).
"0Kelly v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 60 Wis. 480, 19 N.W. 521 (1884) ; Meier
v. Paulus, 70 Wis. 165, 35 N.W. 301 (1887); Nichols v. McGeoch, 78 Wis.
360, 47 N.W. 372 (1890).
"tHorlick's Malted Milk Co. v. A. Spiegel Co., 155 Wis. 201, 144 N.W. 272
(1901).
12 Kelly v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 60 Wis. 480, 19 N.W. 521 (1884).
13 Schmidt v. Menasha W. W. Co., 92 Wis. 529, 66 N.W. 695 (1896).
14 Cleveland, Ex'rs. v. Burnham, 60 Wis. 16, 17 N.W. 126, 18 N.W. 190 (1884);
Frawley v. Cosgrove, 83 Wis. 441, 53 N.W. 689 (1892) ; State v. Baetz, et al,
86 Wis. 29, 56 N.W. 329 (1893); Schmidt v. Menasha W. W. Co., 92 Wis.
529, 66 N.W. 695 (1896) ; Heckendorn v. Romandka, 138 Wis. 416, 120 N.W.
257 (1909) ; Sullivan v. Ashland L. P. & St. Ry. Co., 152 Wis. 574, 140 N.W.
316 (1913) ; Rohleder v. Wright, 162 Wis. 580, 156 N.W. 955 (1916); Singer
Sewing Machine Co. v. Lang, 186 Wis. 530, 203 N.W. 399 (1925).
's Rohleder v. Wright, 162 Wis. 580, 156 N.W. 955 (1920).
2 Worthington P. & M. Co. v. Northwestern I. Co., 176 Wis. 35, 186 N.W. 156
(1922).
'1 Lange v. Heckel, 171 Wis. 29, 176 N.W. 60 (1920).
'1 Schmidt v. Menasha W. W. Co., 92 Wis. 529, 66 N.W. 695 (1879).
19 McNally v. Andrews, 98 Wis. 62, 73 N.W. 315 (1897).
20 Schwickerath v. Loben, 48 Wis. 601, 4 N.W. 760 (1879).
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that machinery was sold and royalties paid to the defendant without
an allegation that the defendant owed anything, it was held that
the action was improperly brought for an accounting and that
plaintiff ought to have served a summons and made use of an adverse
examination to plead.21 In Meyer v. Gorthwaite22 it was held that the
right to discovery was abrogated only when in aid of another action
and that where grounds for equitable jurisdiction are shown and discovery is necessary therein, it is proper within that action. The statute
merely substituted an entirely different procedure and the right remained in the legislature to provide other appropriate means of discovery in proper cases.2 3 The privilege of examining under the statute
is one of procedure and not one of substantive law; and the fact that
the laws of another state do not provide for such a remedy is not such
to equity
a ground of hardship, oppression or fraud as will give 2rise
4
jurisdiction to restrain a suit brought in such other state.
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS AND PROCEDURE

Following closely upon the enactment of the original statute 5 the
court held that the examination must be taken before an officer therein
enumerated. 26 In Whereatt v. Allis27 it was held that while the statute
in question allowed the examination before a "judge at chambers," the
words were merely indicative and by statute28 a court commissioner
exercised powers co-extensive with the former unless otherwise directed. The court commissioner need not be an officer of the court in
which the action is pending-as where the examination is to be had
in another county 29 ; or where the proceeding is in county court, and
examination is to be had before a court commissioner.30
The statute must be complied with as to the procedure therein contemplated for in Hinchliff v. Hinmann a deposition attempted to be
taken thereunder was not permitted to be used on trial since it was
taken before a justice of the peace, an officer not named therein. Where
an order (held to take the place of the statutory notice and subpoena)
2

Richards v. Allis, 82 Wis. 509, 52 N.W. 593 (1892); But see Oconto County

v. Carey, 183 Wis. 420, 198 N.W. 590 (1924) and City of Milwaukee v. Drew,
265 N.W. 683 (Wis., 1936).
22 192 Wis. 571, 213 N.W. 300 (1926).
2- State v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 132 Wis. 345, 112 N.W. 515 (1907).

Chicago M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. McGinley, 171 Wis. 566, 177 N.W. 917 (1922);
Chicago M. St. P. Ry. Co. v. Wolf, 199 Wis. 278, 226 N.W. 297 (1929).
25 WIs. REv. STAT. (1858) c. 137, §§ 54, 55.
2
6Hinchliff v. Hinman, 18 Wis. 139 (*130) (1864).
Wis. 639, 27 N.W. 630 (1886).
8
2 Wis. REv. STAT. (1878) §§ 2434, 2435 [Now Wis. STAT. (1935)
252.16].
29 Whereatt v. Allis, 65 Wis. 639, 27 N.W. 630 (1886).
3o Frawley v. Cosgrove, 83 Wis. 441, 53 N.W. 689 (1892).
3118 Wis. 129 (*130)
(1864).
2765

§§ 252.15,
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for appearance which recited that it be served and fees paid within the
time limited by statute was served within such time, but the fees were
withheld until one day too late, it was held that the party need not
attend the hearing. The acceptance of fees and appearance by attorney
32
for the purpose of objecting did not cure the defect.
The examination may be had, by the terms of the statute, at various
stages during the progress of an action or proceeding. In Blossom v.
Ludington33 it was used for the p-urpose of obtaining facts in order to
amend the complaint after a demurrer thereto. Where issue was joined
between plaintiff and a garnishee defendant; an examination of the
principal defendant was allowed, though the latter had not answered,
because the answer of the garnishee defendant inured to his benefit
and to all practical purposes it was at issue as to him.- The presentation of a claim in county court has been deemed the commencement of
an action and in effect a suit at law but, in any case, if not strictly that,
it falls within the meaning of the term "proceeding" as used in the
statute and an examination of the claimant by the objecting executor
is proper.- The examination of one defendant by his co-defendant is
contemplated by the statute38 In Stewart v. Olsonn where plaintiff, on
trial, was allowed to amend his complaint to plead violation of ordinances, the trial court allowed the defendant, as a condition, a further
adverse examination of plaintiff.
In State ex rel. Carpenterv. Mathys respondent was allowed to examine the relator before the return of a writ of certiorari.38 In Ellinger
v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.3 9 an examination of a party seeking relief under the statute providing for inspection of books and records40
was allowed. It was there held that the relief sought was a "proceeding" within the contemplation of the statute and that the word "plead"
as used in the statute included not only the complaint, answer, or reply,
but also extended to a claim urged in the defense of a proceeding instituted by either party in aid of an action or defense to an action and
which proceeding might be put in issue and tried. But an adverse examination is not in substance and effect a calling of a party as a witness
on a "trial in a court of justice" within the meaning of Section 2020,
Wisconsin Statutes (now Section 220.06), providing for a raising of
32

First Nat'l. Bank of Elkhorn v. Wood, 26 Wis. 500 (1870).

33 32 Wis. 212 (1873).

mMygatt v. Burton, 74 Wis. 352, 43 N.W. 100 (1889).

85 Frawley v. Cosgrove, 83 Wis. 441, 53 N.W. 689 (1892).
36 Neeves v. Gregory, 86 Wis. 319, 56 N.W. 909 (1893) ; O'Connor v. Pawling &
Harnischfeger Co., 185 Wis. 226, 201 N.W. 393 (1924).
37 188 Wis. 487, 206 N.W. 909 (1925).
88 116 Wis. 31, 91 N.W. 114 (1902).
39 125 Wis. 643, 104 N.W. 811 (1905).
0 Wis. STAT. (1935) § 269.59.
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the bar of secrecy enjoined upon the records of the Banking Commission; the remedy precedes the "trial" as the latter is used.' On a
petition and order to show cause to revive a judgment of divorce which
provided for monthly payments as "a final division and distribution"
it was held not to be a final judgment, and was subject to revision and
alteration. An examination of the defendant was allowed, the court
stating that it would be an extremely technical and narrow construction
of the statute to deny its use in aid of such an application. 2 In Bresadola v. Gogebic & Iron Counties R. & L. Co.4 3 an examination was denied where its use was attempted in defense of a motion to set aside
the service of a summons. The relief which defendant was seeking was
there held to be a mere motion in an action and neither an "action" nor
a "proceeding" within the statute.
Where sureties are parties to the action, the fact that they do not
know the facts as to their principal's defaults will not prevent their
examination as parties. If they are ignorant of the matters in inquiry,
the examination will necessarily be brief." The directors of a corporation though not necessary parties to plaintiff's action to compel delivery
of stock were proper parties defendant to enable the plaintiff to obtain
a discovery under the statute.45 In a controversy between an executor
and the state over stock issued by relator, the latter was held not to be
a party to the controversy and no examination or inspection of its
books would be allowed.4 6 In Phipps v. Wisconsin Central Ry. Co.47
that section of the statute allowing an examination of a former employee of a corporation was held unconstitutional since it did not also
provide for an examination of a former employee of an individual,
thus making an unreasonable classification. The examination of a
father, guardian ad litem for an infant plaintiff, was refused by the
court in Hohleder v. Wright on the ground that he was merely a
nominal party and not an agent of the ward, and that the examination
contemplated by the statute was of the real party in interest.4 8
In Neeves v. Gregory,49 it was held that the examination under
the statute may in all cases be conducted upon oral interrogatories
whether the examination is to be held within or without the state. The
party to be examined had contended that under the wording of the
41 Cousins v. Schroeder, 169 Wis. 438, 172 N.W. 953 (1919).

42 Norris v. Norris, 162 Wis. 356, 156 N.W. 778 (1916).
43 165 Wis. 109, 161 N.W. 362 (1917).
4-

State v. Baetz, 86 Wis. 29, 56 N.W. 329 (1893).

4 Wells v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co., 90 Wis. 442, 64 N.W. 69 (1895).

46 State, ex rel. Pabst Brewing Co. v. Carpenter, 129 Wis. 180, 108 N.W. 641
(1906).
47 133 Wis. 153, 113 N.W. 456 (1907).
8 162 Wis. 580, 156 N.W. 955 (1916).
4986 Wis. 319, 56 N.W. 909 (1893).
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statute the examination outside of the state upon commission must be
taken in the same manner as provided for the taking of other depositions upon commission. It was there held that the manifest purpose of
the statute was to give every reasonable opportunity for a most thorough
examination and that it is accomplished most effectively by oral interrogatories.. In an action for libel between non-residents of this state
both of whom resided in Switzerland, the rule of the preceding case
was followed; and the court stated that the provisions regarding the
taking of other depositions do not over-ride the provisions of the
statute in question and the decisions of the court construing the same.60
In this case accompanying the commission letters rogotory were issued
at the same time to compel the attendance and require the submission
to the examination by the party to be examined. As to that phase the
court states that although in this case such letters may not have been
necessary to safeguard the rights of the party examining, yet cases
might arise where the issuance of such letters would be essential to the
promotion of the ends of justice and therefore it is within the discretion of the trial court to order such letters to be issued.
In George v. Bode5 the plaintiff, a resident of Mississippi, was
sought to be examined by the defendant in order for the latter to plead.
Upon motion to fix a time and place within this state and to require
plaintiff to attend and submit to the examination the court held, affirming the ruling of the lower court that although the party was entitled
to the examination, yet, unless the plaintiff could be served personally
with the notice and subpoena, the court had no power under the statute
to compel his appearance and submission to the examination. The court
in so holding overruled the contention of the defendant that the amendment of Chapter 84, Laws of 1909, would have nothing to refer to unless a contrary ruling gave effect to it and held that the provision of
Sub-section 652 relating to the personal service of the notice and subpoena, comes under the rule of expresso unius, exciusio alterius. A
consideration of the amendment of Chapter 239, Laws of 1919, which
added to Sub-section 353 the words "either within or without the state"
was left for the future.
In Kentucky Finance Co. v. ParamountAutomobile Exchange' the
plaintiff, a non-resident corporation, was by order of the court required
to submit to an examination under the amendment just referred to, to
be had within this state. Upon his failure to appear, the plaintiff's complaint was stricken and the action dismissed on the ground that the
H v. Keene, 137 Wis. 625, 119 N.W. 303 (1909).
Hite
170 Wis. 411, 175 N.W. 939 (1920).

52 Wis. REv.
53 WIS. REV.

(1898) § 4096 (6).
(1898) § 4096 (3).
5171 Wis. 586, 178 N.W. 9 (1920).
STAT.
STAT.
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section of the statute was constitutional; that having no county or residence within this state, the party cannot be heard to complain on that
ground; and that the provision regarding the service of a notice and
subpoena within a county in this state was merely cumulative and not
intended to be the exclusive remedy in the case of an examination of a
non-resident. Plaintiff made no showing that the orders were arbitrary
or oppressive or to require that which was beyond the power or ability
of the plaintiff. However, on appeal to the United States Supreme
Court5 5 it was held that the statute, as applied, was invalid since it
denied the equal protection of the law to a non-resident corporation.
The provisions of the statute required that a non-resident individual, in
order to be examined within the state, be served with a notice and subpoena within the state, thus placing a more onerous burden upon a nonresident corporation. In Gallun v. Hibernia Bank & Trust Co.56 it was
held that a party having first procured an order requiring the production of books and papers under this statute at a place without the state
is also entitled to proceed by an examination of an officer within the
state where proper service was obtained; the one remedy is not exclusive of the other under this statute even though the officer would
be required to produce the identical papers upon both examinations.
The original enactment 7 as amended was held to be vague as to the
manner of conducting the examination, and the court had the right to
control and direct the procedure where no court rule was set up in
order to prevent abuse." In Stewart v. Allen59 it was held that under
the statute the proper procedure for the court commissioner to follow
was to certify the questions to the court in which the examination was
had and then the court should exercise its discretion and enforce its
rulings. It was there stated that the court did not decide as to whether
the commissioner should rule out questions which he deemed immaterial or irrelevant. But as it presently exists the statutory procedure
provides for a determination of the court rather than of the commissioner. ° In Kelly v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co.6 1 it was held that the
real issues may not be narrowed, but if they are too indefinite the court
may define them and then outline the general scope of inquiry. It is for
the lower court to exercise its discretion in the first instance ;2 and
Kentucky Finance Co. v. Paramount Auto Exchange, 262 U.S. 547, 43 Sup. Ct.
636, 67 L.ed. 1112 (1923).
56 182 Wis. 40, 195 N.W. 703 (1923).
57 Wis. REv. STAT. (1858) c. 137, §§ 54, 55.
,8Blossom v. Ludington, 32 Wis. 212 (1873).
5945 Wis. 158 (1878).
60 State ex rel. Finnegan v. Lincoln Dairy Co., 265 N.W. 202 (Wis. 1936).
6" 60 Wis. 480, 19 N.W. 521 (1884).
62 Karel v. Conlan, 155 Wis. 221, 144 N.W. 256 (1913) ; Ballun v. Hibernia Bank
& Trust Co., 182 Wis. 40, 195 N.W. 703 (1923); American Food Products
Co. v. American Milling Co., 151 Wis. 385, 138 N.W. 1123 (1912).
55
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where the witness claims privilege on the ground that the answer might
tend to incriminate him such opinion is not conclusive upon the lower
court, but the answer should not be compelled unless it is reasonably
clear it can have no such effect.6 3 Where the questions are held to be

privileged although pertinent to the inquiry from the nature of the
complaint the witness should not be compelled to answer.6 But where
the privilege was a qualified one only, and there was an issue for the
jury, examination was allowed.6 5 The right to an adverse examination
of a defendant is dependent upon whether the plaintiff has a cause of
action, and where it appears that no cause of action exists the examination should be denied.6 6 The nature and purpose of the action must be
determined from the affidavit in support of an adverse examination to
plead and where by the affidavit it affirmatively shows that no cause
of action exists the examination should be suppressed and the action
dismissed on its merits.6 The right to the examination under the
statute can be justified only upon the ground that the courts are entitled
to information in aid of proper judicial proceedings; but the statute
goes no further, and where it is apparent that there is no such judicial
proceeding pending the examination should not be allowed. The court
under such circumstances, when the futility of the alleged attempt to
institute a suit is manifest, should not only restrain the examination but
should dismiss the ostensible action.6s
The defendant in an affidavit for an adverse examination in order
to prepare his answer, cannot by stating the necessity for the examination conclude the court as to what is necessary for'him to answer. In
such case that question is to be determined from the averments of the
complaint together with any explanation or new matter in the affidavit.
It must appear that the points desired are necessary to enable him to
plead and then the examination is to be limited to matters relevant to
these points; but even then the court may further limit the scope of the
examination to the extent of denying it absolutely. Such action
being discretionary with the trial court, on appeal, the exercise of such
discretion will not be reversed unless clearly shown to have been
abusive. 69 Or, if for any other reason recognized by rule it would be

improper for the party at that stage to proceed with the examination,
the court may deny its use.70
Karel v. Conlan, 155 Wis. 221, 144 N.W. 256 (1913).
Schultz v. Strauss, 127 Wis. 325, 106 N.W. 1066 (1906).
65 Hathaway v. Bruggink, 168 Wis. 390, 170 N.W. 244 (1919).
I6 Schultz v. Strauss, 127 Wis. 325, 106 N.W. 1066 (1906).
67 City of Madison v. Madison Gas & Elec. Co., 129 Wis. 249, 108 N.W. 65
(1906).
68 State v. Milwaukee Elec. R. & L. Co., 136 Wis. 179, 116 N.W. 900, (1908).
69
Badger Brass Co. v. Daly, 137 Wis. 601, 119 N.W. 328 (1909).
70 Ellinger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 138 Wis. 390, 120 N.W. 235 (1909).
63

64
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At an early date, in State v. Baetz" it was held that, although the
affidavit made for an adverse examination to plead disclosed that
plaintiff could frame some kind of complaint, the examination should
proceed since the party seeking it has that right in order to make the
allegations of the pleading definite and certain. And where the plaintiff
does not know facts in detail in order to frame a complaint adapted to
the real nature of his case, an examination should be allowed as to the
material facts of the case in order to frame a complaint suited to his
case and one on which he may safely proceed to trial. 2 The purpose of
the examination is to discover facts and the affidavit need not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; for if the party could
do so he could plead and the examination could not be had. The examination may be had even though the plaintiff does not know a cause
of action exists, and though the affidavit affirmatively shows that he
does not know.73 This is so where the facts stated in the affidavit
charge that the plaintiff may be entitled to recover, whether the imputations therein are well founded or not. The statements in the affidavit
as to the general nature and object of the action were held not to be
an election of remedies so as to limit the cause of action after learning
the details. After the examination the plaintiff may elect the most complete and efficient remedy. 4 But the service of an answer by the defendant waived his right to an examination under the statute to plead. 5
The purpose of the affidavit is to limit the scope of the examination
to facts relevant to the points therein outlined and to enable the court
in its discretion to further limit its extent."' The court may limit the
examination but cannot deny its use absolutely." The affidavit need
not state that the facts upon which discovery is sought are not within
plaintiff's knowledge since that is not a statutory requirement."" If the
party seeking the examination has a right to it, it should be allowed
without reference to motives. As construed by the court the adversary
is given ample protection against unnecessary and improper examinaWis. 29, 56 N.W. 329 (1893).
72 Schmidt v. Menasha W. W. Co., 92 Wis. 529, 66 N.W. 695 (1896) ; Sullivan
v. Ashland L. P. & St. Ry. Co., 152 Wis. 574, 140 N.W. 316 (1913).
7 Gratz v. Parker, 137 Wis. 104, 118 N.W. 637 (1908) ; Aperican Food Products
Co. v. American Milling Co., 151 Wis. 385, 138 N.W. 1123 (1912); Sullivan
v. Ashland L. P. & St. Ry. Co., 152 Wis. 574, 140 N.W. 316 (1913); Singer
Sewing Machine Co. v. Lange, 186 Wis. 530, 203 N.W. 399 (1925).
74
Heckendorn v. Romadka, 138 Wis. 416, 120 N.W. 257 (1909); Sullivan v. Ashland L. P. & St. Ry. Co., 152 Wis. 574, 140 N.W. 316 (1913).
50conto Land Co. v. Mosling, 122 Wis. 440, 100 N.W. 824 (1904).
7, Schmidt v. Menasha W. W. Co., 92 Wis. 529, 66 N.W. 695 (1896).
7 Schmidt v. Menasha W. W. Co., supra, note 76; Singer Sewing Machine Co.
v. Lang, 186 Wis. 530, 203 N.W. 399 (1925) ; Stott v. Markle, 215 Wis. 528,
255 N.W. 540 (1934).
78 Gratz v. Parker, 137 Wis. 104, 118 N.W. 637 (1908).
7186

19361

DISCOVERY EXAMINATION

tion19 Where defendants disclaimed any interest in transactions on
plaintiff's books with third parties, there could be no abuse if the examination after issue joined was by order limited to that extent 0
The counter affidavits in opposition to such an examination are insufficient to defeat the discovery based upon an affidavit made in compliance with the statute.8 ' But the trial court has the power and duty of
determining whether the showing made by the party seeking the examination is sufficient to warrant its allowance, 2 since the matter of an
examination under the statute is very largely in the discretion of the
trial court8 The court on a motion to suppress an examination to
plead, however, cannot try out the question as to whether a cause of
action exists between the parties.
In Phipps v. Wisconsin Central Ry. Co."' it was held that the
statute contemplated but one examination by a party after issue joined
(though that one might be of several witnesses), where after examining
the attorney, secretary, and chief engineer of the defendant, the plaintiff then noticed an examination of ten others alleged to be employees
or former employees of the defendant. It was stated, however, that the
right to a further examination in a proper case on account of inadvertance, surprise or excusable neglect undoubtedly existed and should
be allowed on application to the court in which the action was pending,
on proper notice and showing-a construction which was reasonable
and one best calculated to carry out the obvious intent of the legislature.
The subjects of adverse examinations have been practically coextensive with the kinds of actions which have been bought since it was
first enacted. The general rules regarding the taking of the examination
and regarding the power of the court to regulate the scope of the subjects upon which discovery may be allowed have been discussed at
length. However, it may prove of interest to consider at this point the
varied facts and circumstances upon which discovery has been sought,
the questions permitted, and the various books, records and documents
as to which inspection has been allowed. In Cleveland, Exrs. v. Burnham8 6 disclosure of the time when the party examined became a stockholder and for what period of time he was such a stockholder was allowed. Questions as to whether the lease under which plaintiff claimed
79 Ellinger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 138 Wis. 390, 120 N.W. 235 (1909).
80 Nichols

v. McGeoch, 78 Wis. 360, 47 N.W. 372 (1890).

8'

Sullivan v. Ashland L. P. & St. Ry. Co., 152 Wis. 574, 140 N.W. 316 (1913);

82
83

Simon v. deGersdorf, 166 Wis. 170, 164 N.W. 818 (1917).
American Food Products Co. v. American Milling Co., 151 Wis. 385, 138
N.W. 1123 (1912).

Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Lang, 186 Wis. 530, 203 N.W. 399 (1925).

84 Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Lang, 186 Wis. 530, 203 N.W. 399 (1925).
8 133 Wis. 153, 113 N.W. 456 (1907).
86 60 Wis. 16, 17 N.W. 126, 18 N.W. 190, (1884).
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possession was oral or written were held proper since the right to possession was in issue, and the defendant had the right to show by the
plaintiff's answer that the latter's possession was unlawfulY7 Although
knowing the amount of the deposits upon which the plaintiff claimed
defendant had withheld interest, the court required the disclosure of
the names of the banks, the length of time the deposits were in the
banks, the various rates of interest, the time at which the deposits were
made, the amounts of interest received on the deposits, and the proportions of the deposits belonging to various funds of the plaintiff.8
In Schmidt v. Menasha W. W. Co."9 plaintiff, suing for the death of
her husband caused by the blowing out of a plug resulting in deceased
being scalded to death with hot water and steam, was allowed discovery
as to construction and the method of using the tank which contained
the water, the machinery and apparatus connected with it and its management and control. In Phipps v. Wisconsin Central Ry. Co., 0° in an
adverse examination after issue joined, the plaintiff was allowed discovery as to the names of defendant's employees who possessed any
knowledge of the accident which was the subject of the action. In
Sullivan v. Ashland L. P. & St. Ry. Co.91 discovery was sought and allowed upon the following points: The amount of the stocks and bonds
issued and sold by the defendant corporations, the amounts received
on such sales, the disposition of the proceeds of the sales, the commissions paid, the names of the stockholders and directors of each of
the defendants, the cost of the assets purchased, the cost of improvements and repairs, the specific nature of the assets, their value, and the
amount of indebtedness of each of the defendants, and the details as to
the organization and set-up of one of the defendants; upon all of which
plaintiff, a promoter, by agreement was to receive a definite proportion
as his fees.
In Horlick's Malted Milk Co. v. A. Spiegel Co.

2

it was held that

the question as to the ingredients of plaintiff's product was material,
and that defendant had the right to the names and addresses of certain
of plaintiff's witnesses. In Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Lang, 3 in an
action to restrain defendant from selling plaintiff's machines and for an
accounting, plaintiff was allowed discovery as to: the person or persons from whom the machines were obtained, the names and addresses
of the person or persons to whom they were sold and the prices paid,
87 Pride v. Weyenberg, 83 Wis. 59, 53 N.W. 29 (1892).
" State v. Baetz, 86 Wis. 29, 56 N.W. 329 (1893).
8992 Wis. 529, 66 N.W. 695 (1896).
90 130 Wis. 279, 110 N.W. 207 (1907).
"1152 Wis. 574, 140 N.W. 316 (1913).
92 155 Wis. 201, 144 N.W. 272 (1913).
93 186 Wis. 530, 203 N.W. 399 (1925).
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the serial numbers of the machines in defendant's control or under his
possession or sold by him, the person or persons from whom and
through whom the advertising and other material was obtained, the
prices which defendant paid for new machines, the name of the person
or persons with whom he was engaged in buying and selling them, and
the identity of the person or persons who changed, altered or obliterated the serial numbers on the plaintiff's machines in defendant's possession.
As to books and records, prior to the statutory revision of 1925, the
court followed a very liberal rule in this regard. In Nichols v. McGeoch, where defendant in his affidavit showed a necessity therefor, he
was allowed an inspection of plaintiff's books to prepare his defense.
Their production in entirety was required since it was conceivable that
that they did contain evidence. The court stated the rule to be that the
statute required the production of books and papers, which had any
relation to the matters involved in the issues; if they were relevant, they
were to be produced in entirety, and for plaintiff to furnish some of
them was insufficient. In Knowles v. Rogers where plaintiff sought
inspection of defendant's books of account, bought and sold cards, telegrams, tickets and correspondence kept by the latter in his business as a
broker, the commissioner was held to have correctly required the production of those in Milwaukee (where examination was had) relating to the account of plaintiff with defendant, or to any business dealings between them, directly or indirectly. In Phipps v. Wisconsin Central Ry. Co.9 6 defendant was required to produce the plans of the
bridge upon which the accident in controversy occurred and telegrams
and orders sent to the conductor or the train crew of the train which
met with the accident.
In Horlick'sMalted Milk Co. v. A. Spiegel Co.1 7 reports of agents
of the plaintiff upon which the allegations of the complaint, made on
information and belief, was based, were held relevant as indicative of
the truth of plaintiff's allegations that sales by defendant were made
deceptively, the agents having made the specific purchases. The statute
was held also to cover physical objects if relevant, here the containers from which defendant's product was alleged to have been vended
and in plaintiff's possession. In NeKoosa-EdwardsPaper Co. v. News
9 the plaintiff was required to produce evidence or data
Publishing Co.1
with reference to its connection with a manufacturer's association
which defendant contended was illegal, the court holding that a corpo94 78 Wis. 360, 47 N.W. 372 (1890).
95 99 Wis. 231, 74 N.W. 813 (1898).
96130 Wis. 279, 110 N.W. 207 (1907).
97155 Wis. 201, 144 N.W. 272 (1913).
98174 Wis. 107, 182 N.W. 919 (1921).
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ration was not entitled to claim immunity even though the officer or
agent testifying might thereby implicate himself. But where plaintiff
brought suit for defamation based upon statements made by the defendant before a grand jury and to the district attorney, upon which
plaintiff was indicted, defendant's right to claim privilege was upheld
as to questions pertaining to such proceedings, since plaintiff had no
cause of action as to them. Even though they were pertinent and material, disclosure could not be compelled. 99 And where plaintiff, in a
labor dispute, sought an injunction, defendant noticed an examination
to plead on the following points: concerning the operation and management of the corporation, as to defendant's conspiracy to prevent
plaintiff from securing men, the manner in which the acts complained
of were performed, whether the defendants had stationed pickets,
whether certain allegations of the complaint were not maliciously false
and untrue and made pursuant to an employer's conspiracy. They were
denied. The court held that as to those points not within defendant's
own knowledge, it was not necessary to plead them. The examination
was denied.1 0 A similar result was reached in Ellinger v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc.,10' where plaintiff's affidavit disclosed that after having had an inspection of defendant's books, he had all the information
necessary to plead.
The sufficiency of the demands of a subpoena duces tecum requiring production of certain patents was considered in Miller Saw Trimimng Co. v. Cheshire10 2 on a motion for new trial. It was held that the
description of the papers and records was not specific enough to require the production of the certain papers and records upon which the
motion was based; and further, there was no refusal, evasion, deception, trick or artifice practiced in such withholding. Then in Northern
Wisconsin Co-operative Tobacco Pool v. Oleson,0 1 where defendant
appealed to the court for an order requiring plaintiff to submit to an
examination which he had noticed under the statute, it was held that
he sought thereby an inspection of books and records under Section
4183 (now Section 269.57). But the court went on to say that neither
remedy authorized an indiscriminate exploration into matters extrinsic
to the controversy, and a party may not be granted a roving commission
to ransack his adversary's records without limitation. Thus did the
court indicate a trend toward conservatism in the regulation of the
99 Schultz

v. Straus,'127 Wis. 325, 106 N.W. 1066 (1906) ; see also State, ex rel.
Schumacher v. Markham, 162 Wis. 55, 155 N.W. 917 (1929) as to confidential
records of banking commission.
100 Badger Brass Co. v. Daly, 137 Wis. 601, 119 N.W. 328 (1909).
101 138 Wis. 390, 120 N.W. 235 (1909).
102 177 Wis. 354, 189 N.W. 465 (1922).
103 191 Wis. 586, 211 N.W. 923 (1927).
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scope of this remedy. At or about the time of this decision a most significant change occurred in the wording of the discovery statute. As
was pointed out early in the article the statute was completely revised
by Chapter 523, Laws of 1927. By this enactment Subsection (3), Section 326.12 of the Wisconsin Statutes, 1925, was dropped and no provision was included in the revised statute to require the production of
" * * * all papers, books, files, records, things and matters in the possession of such party * * *."
In the revisor's Notes 1 to this section no mention is made of this
change, which may or may not have been of some weight in considering the intention of the legislature. However, the question was answered in Stott v. Markle"5 where plaintiff in an action for false representation and suppression of facts in the sales and purchases of certain
securities sought a sweeping examination of defendant's records,
papers and documents relating to dealings over a period of years. The
court held that the omission just considered occurred by reason of the
fact that it was felt that Section 325.01 contained all the provisions
necessary to the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. The effect of this
construction was to limit the party examining to "lawful instruments
of, evidence."'1 The subpoena duces tecum may no longer be used to
procure an inspection of the adversary's records and files to determine
whether they contain evidence. It must be directed to particular documents, papers, or books required for introduction in evidence; and only
when it is made to appear that the party examined has the papers containing matters necessary for plaintiff to know in order to enable him
to plead, will it be time to require their production. An inspection of
books, records and papers can be justified only under Section 269.57.
The court then states that if by order, under the statute last cited, the
court may not open an unlimited field for exploration or indiscriminate
fishing expedition, then a magistrate by inserting a duces tecum provision in a subpoena cannot do so.
USE: OF THE DEPOSITION TAKEN

The obvious purpose in permitting the examination of a party to
the action or his or its agent or employee was to make available to the
party taking the examination evidence relevant to the controversy. The
statements and answers to questions by the party so examined are in
the nature of admissions against him and under the rules of evidence
are therefore material to the issues-0' It has been held that such ad'04 Wisconsin Annotations (1930).
105 215 Wis. 528, 255 N.W. 540 (1934).
106 WIS. STAT. (1935) § 325.02 (2).
'-0

Meier v. Paulus, 70 Wis. 165, 35 N.W. 301 (1887); Lange v. Heckel, 171
Wis. 59, 175 N.W. 788 (1920); Leslie v. Knudsen, 205 Wis. 517, 238 N.W.
397 (1931).
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missions are independent evidence. 05 However, prior to the enactment
of Chapter 246, Laws of 1913, it was held that the adverse examination
of one not a party to an action could not be used where the witness
was in court, as in the case of Kreider v. Wisconsin River Paper &
Pulp Co.,"0 9 where the witness testified that he was merely a local
manager of one of defendant's mills and the statute permitted the introduction of the adverse examination of a "general managing agent."
The court said that the section in question referred to an agent having
general supervision over the affairs of the corporation. The foregoing
rule was followed in the case of Hughes v. Chicago, St. P. M. & 0. R.
Co."' where it was held that the trial court erred in allowing the
plaintiff to read the deposition of a contractor and of an engineer of
the defendant where the persons were in court. The court further stated
that the cases theretofore decided were merely authority for the proposition that only in the case of depositions of parties to the action could
they be used as original evidence although the latter were present in
court. In any other case the party to the action was entitled to have
the witness examined in open court according to the rule of the common law. In Anderson v. Chicago Brass Co."" a foreman was held not
an "officer" but a mere employee and where present in court his deposition was inadmissible; likewise the deposition of a superintendent
where the evidence showed that he was a mere employee." 2 The adverse examination of an officer of the defendant was held to be the
examination of a party as affecting its admissibility on trial where the
party examined was present in court."13 The court said that the effort
of the legislature to give the right to obtain disclosures in the case of
corporations as fully as in the case of individuals would be defeated
if the ruling were otherwise. Thus the examination of an officer becomes independent evidence upon the trial of an action against the
corporation by which he was employed.
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 246, Laws of 1913, which amendment to Section 326.12 of the Wisconsin Statutes changed the foregoing rule, the deposition of a superintendent and officer of the defendant was held to be that of a principal officer under the testimony
there adduced and not that of a mere employee." 4 Likewise in the case
of a president, secretary and other officers, for, so far as their testimony was competent, it was admissible though the witnesses were pres108 J. H. Clark Co. v. Rice, 127 Wis. 451, 106 N.W. 231 (1906).
109 110 Wis. 645, 86 N.W. 662 (1901).

"1o 122 Wis. 258, 99 N.W. 897 (1904).
I1 127 Wis. 273, 106 N.W. 1077 (1906).
' 'Zoesch v. Flambeau Paper Co., 134 Wis. 271, 114 N.W. 485 (1908) ; see also
Charron v. N. W. Fuel Co., 143 Wis. 437, 128 N.W. 75 (1910).
"'s Johnson v. St. Paul & Western Coal Co., 126 Wis. 492, 105 N.W. 1048 (1906).
"14 Johnson v. St. Paul & Western Coal Co., 126 Wis. 492, 105 N.W. 1048 (1906).
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ent in court." It was held error to refuse the admission of the deposition of a superintendent.?
In Leslie v. Knudsen"7 it was held that the lower court erred in
refusing plaintiff the right to read from the examination of defendant
before examining him adversely at the trial, by reason of the fact that
such deposition was substantive evidence against him and the statements therein were not limited to their effect in impeaching him as a
party or witness. The fact that a party denied the right to read the adverse examination of his opponent, called the latter and examined him
on trial, does not cure such error since he has the right, if he wishes to
do so, to use the sworn admissions made on the adverse examination. If
the defendant then desires to contradict or correct such testimony he
should be compelled to do so as a witness in his own behalf and not
as a witness of the party who examined him. The same reasons exist
for its use at the trial as at the time of taking. The party reading the
deposition may after introducing it in evidence rebut the testimony
there given as though it were that of a hostile witness? 8 Upon the
cross-examination of an employee whose examination had been taken
under the statute he may be confronted with contradictory statements
made therein.""
On the trial of an action the statements in the examination introduced in evidence by the adverse party may be explained, contradicted
or qualified 20 This rule was elaborated upon in Jacobsen v. Whitely*1" where it was said that anything fairly explanatory of what trans-

pired upon the hearing or what was drawn out on cross-examination
was proper rebuttal. The jury may properly consider the circumstances
under which the adverse examination was taken as affecting the ansxwers made thereon, and any contradiction between the several answers
merely presents a contrary state of evidence, within the province of the
1 22
jury to decide which is correct
A deposition taken upon adverse examination does not become
evidence until it has been offered by the party taking it and received
by the court. It is then evidence only for the party taking it.12 3 It is not
properly in evidence until offered and it does not become a part of the
record until then.124 Its use is not similar to that of a deposition taken
115 J. H. Clark Co. v. Rice, 127 Wis. 451, 106 N.W. 231 (1906).
'' Charron v. N.W. Fuel Co., 143 Wis. 437, 128 N.W. 75 (1910).
" 205 Wis. 517, 238 N.W. 397 (1931).
8 Meier v. Paulus, 70 Wis. 165, 35 N.W. 301 (1887).
" Jirachek v. T. M. E. R. & L. Co., 139 Wis. 505, 121 N.W. 325 (1909).
2 0
Klauber v. Wright, 52 Wis. 303, 8 N.W. 893 (1881).
121 138 Wis. 434, 120 N.W. 285 (1909).
122 Swiegul v. Town of Suamico, 204 Wis. 114, 235 N.W. 548 (1931).
122 Maldaner v. Smith, 102 Wis. 30, 78 N.W. 140 (1899).
1m Estate of Shinoe-Bollen v. Shinoe, 212 Wis. 481, 250 N.W. 505 (1933).
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to be used as evidence on trial. Its admissibility is dependent, as has
been demonstrated, upon the fact that the statements amount to admissions against interest. Thus the deposition may not be used unless
first offered by the party taking it. The express provision of the statute
has been construed by the court in the following cases to fall within
the rule of inclusio unius, exclusid alterius.'25 The court at an early

date and prior to the amendment defining its use intimated that both

2
parties might use the deposition on trial.1

Where the deposition is offered by the party examined, it is his own
evidence and the party who took it may object to its competency and to
his own interrogatories made thereon. The foundation for its use must
first be laid by the party taking it.' z Thus in cases involving transactions with deceased persons where the door to the admission of testimony is not opened upon the trial by the offer of a deposition containing such testimony by the party taking it, the party examined as to
such testimony and transactions is barred from offering the incompetent deposition'2, However, where the party offers the adverse examination containing testimony as to transactions with a deceased, the
door is opened as effectually as if the party was examined adversely
on trial as to the same subject matter. Upon the offer of the deposition
without qualification or reservation, the deposition so offered may then
be used by the party examined and the whole subject may be gone
into.1 2 As to the party whose deposition has been taken the statements
therein are merely self-serving as originally offered even though made
under oath. 130 Chapter 246, Laws of 1913, in allowing the admission
of an adverse examination of an employee, went no farther and did
not affect the rule that the defendant may not offer such examination
when such examination has not first been offered by the party taking
it."
Subsequent to the introduction of portions of the adverse examination by the party who has had it- taken, the party examined may then
offer other portions such as are relevant and relate to the same subject
and tend to explain what has been read.13 2 But the court may not com125

Maldaner v. Smith, 102 Wis. 30, 78 N.W. 140 (1899) ; Wunderlich v. Palatine

Fire Ins. Co., 104 Wis. 382, 80 N.W. 467 (1899) ; Estate of Shinoe-Bollen v.

Shinoe, 212 Wis. 481, 250 N.W. 505 (1933); Drexler v. Zohlen, 216 Wis. 483,
257 N.W. 675 (1934).
126Kelly v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 60 Wis. 480, 19 N.W. 521 (1884).
127 Maldaner v. Smith, 102 Wis. 30, 78 N.W. 140 (1899) ; Lamberson v. Lamberson, 175 Wis. 398, 184 N.W. 708 (1921).
128 Maldaner v. Smith, 102 Wis. 30, 78 N.W. 140 (1899) ; F. H. Bresler Co. v.
Bauer, Exec., 212 Wis. 386, 248 N.W. 788 (1933) ; Estate of Shinoe-Bollen v.
Shinoe, 212 Wis. 481, 250 N.W. 505 (1933).
2
'1 Larnberson v. Lamberson, 175 Wis. 398, 184 N.W. 708 (1921).
'3o Estate of Shinoe-Bollen v. Shinoe, 212 Wis. 481, 250 N.W. 505 (1933).
31
m Thomas v. Lockwood Oil Co., 174 Wis. 486, 182 N.W. 841 (1921).
1 1 Wunderlich v. Palatine Fire Ins. Co., 104 Wis. 382, 80 N.W. 467 (1899).
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pel the admission of the entire examination where certain portions
were offered by the party taking it. Such party may read the parts
that are relevant and relate to a distinct transaction 3 3 But an objection
to the admission of the whole of a deposition after the objecting party
had offered selected parts thereof, has been held too general, since portions clearly related to and served to qualify and explain the extracts
which the objector had introduced, even though other parts were inadmissible.3"
In Thomas v. Lockwood Oil Co. and Drexler v. Zohlen 35 the question as to whether in the absence of a party or witness either deceased,
absent from the state or impossible to produce at the trial, his deposition might be received in evidence under Section 325.31, Wisconsin
Statutes, has been touched upon but no ruling has been made. In
neither one of the cases was it shown that any facts existed for the
application of the provisions of the statute covering such situations.
In the latter case the court stated that it may be doubted whether the
provisions of that section apply to the examination of a party, but
under the evidence it was not shown that the party was deceased nor
absent from the state nor that he could not be produced; and in the
absence of such showing the adverse examination of a co-defendant
of the party offering taken by the plaintiff was refused admission'3 6
The provisions of the latter section cannot be used in any case where
the adverse examination of the deceased party related to a transaction
between her and the deceased agent of the plaintiff, where the plaintiff
refused to use it on trial so as to keep the door closed."a However,
where the examination of the defendant taken under Section 326.12
was offered by the defendant's administratrix it was admitted under
Section 325.31.138 A deposition used in a former trial has been admitted
in evidence on the re-trial of the case."3 9
It has been held that forged receipts and copies which the defendant was compelled to make upon adverse examination may be used as
specimens of genuine handwriting and submitted to experts and to the
jury as such.' 40 A garnishee defendant examined under the statute
was not bound thereby as by a pleading except for a denial of liability,
the remainder being a mere examination into the facts? 4'
"'Wunderlich v. Palatine Fire Ins. Co., 104 Wis. 382, 80 N.W. 467 (1899);
Gutzman v. Clancy, 114 Wis. 589, 90 N.W. 1081 (1902).
34 Gutzman v. Clancy, 114 Wis. 589, 90 N.W. 1081 (1902).
135 174 Wis. 486, 182 N.W. 841 (1921) ; 216 Wis. 483, 257 N.W. 675 (1934).
136 Drexler v. Zohlen, 216 Wis. 483, 257 N.W. 675 (1934).
'37 F. H. Bresler Co. v. Bauer, Exec., 212 Wis. 386, 248 N.W. 788 (1933).
13s Nelson v. Ziegler, 196 Wis. 426, 220 N.W. 194 (1928).
13 Frame v. Attermeier, 147 Wis. 485, 133 N.W. 603 (1911).
140 Lappley v. State, 170 Wis. 356, 174 N.W. 913 (1919).
34" Klauber v. Wright, 52 Wis. 303, 8 N.W. 893 (1881).
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APPEALS FROM THE ORDERS MADE IN THE COURSE
OF THE EXAMINATION
A discussion upon the question of appealability of orders made in

connection with the statute in question resolves itself in the first instance into a consideration of the nature of this remedy. As early as
1884, in the case of Cleveland, Exrs. v. Burnham,142 the court in denying a motion to dismiss an appeal from an order of the lower court
directing defendant to answer and granting costs, held that such order
was "a final order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding," and therefore within Section 274.33 (2) [then Section 3069
(2) ]. This rule was followed in a number of cases 14 3 without further
discussion, under facts very similar to the decision above. Then, in
Knowles v. Rogers,'4 on an appeal from an order denying defendant's
motion to quash and limit his examination, it was held to be not an
appealable order under Section 274.33 (3), [then Section 3069 (3),
Wisconsin Revised Statutes] neither granting, refusing, continuing or
modifying a provisional remedy. This holding was followed in State
ex rel. Carpenter v. Matheys 45 where an order denying a motion to
limit the subjects of the examination with costs was dismissed as not
appealable.
These conflicting rulings as to the nature of this remedy soon were
to meet and in Ellinger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc.'" the court
further complicated a perplexing situation by holding an order refusing and staying an examination under the statute as appealable under
both subsections of Section 274.33 (2), (3), [then Section 3069 (2),
(3), Wisconsin Revised Statutes]. The fact that here the defendant
was seeking to examine the plaintiff as to the latter's right to secure
an inspection of books and records of the defendant under Section
269.57, which remedy, itself, was held to be a special proceeding, only
served to complicate the question. However, the court had satisfied
itself with this decision as is indicated in Phipps v. Wisconsin Central
Ry Co.14 7 There an appeal from an order requiring the production of

certain records was dismissed on the ground that it was not a final
order as contemplated by Section 274.33 (3). The remedy was held to
be both a special proceeding and a provisional remedy. On a later appeal from this same case 48 orders requiring a witness to answer and
14260 Wis. 16, 17 N.W. 126, 18 N.W. 190 (1884).
143 Whereatt v. Allis, 65 Wis. 639, 27 N.W. 630 (1886) ; Pride v. Weyenberg, 83

Wis. 59, 53 N.W. 29, (1892); Schmidt v. Menasha W. W. Co., 92 Wis. 529, 66
N.W. 695 (1896).
14499 Wis. 231, 74 N.W. 813 (1898).
11-115 Wis. 31, 88 N.W. 908 (1902).

11"125 Wis. 643, 104 N.W. 811 (1905).
147 130 Wis. 279, 110 N.W. 207 (1907).
248

Phipps v. Wisconsin Central Ry. Co., 133 Wis. 153, 113 N.W. 456 (1907).
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to submit to an examination and refusing to stay and restrain the
taking of depositions of other witnesses were both held to be appealable
as continuing a provisionalremedy. Then in Karel v. Conlan 49 an order
adjudging the witness in contempt for refusing to answer was held to
be a final order in a special proceeding.
Finally, this question was resolved by the court in Milwaukee Corrugating Co. v. Flagge. 50 On a motion to dismiss the appeal from an
order denying a motion to suppress an examination under the statute,
the right so given a party was held to be a provisional remedy. The previous inconsistent holdings were declared to be illogical and erroneous
and specifically disavowed. The examination was held to be a mere
incident to an action; and since by statute's all remedies are either
actions or special proceedings, the examination must be merely a provisional remedy. This case furnishes a landmark in other respects as
will be seen shortly. Following the rule of this case were Mantz v.
Schoen and Walter Co., 5 2 which further held that the order refusing to
stay and suppress the remedy is not a provisional remedy and not appealable, State ex rel. Finneganv. Lincoln Dairy Co.'5 3 which reiterated
the rule of the Mantz case that the whole proceeding is a provisional
remedy and orders determining the procedural steps which may properly be taken when the remedy is invoked in a particular case are not
the remedy so as to make applicable the provisions of Section 274.33
(3).
Attention may now be turned to the question of what orders in
these proceedings have been held appealable. At the outset many of
these will be purely historical in view of the conflict heretofore considered and in view of a further uncertainty which existed prior to
Milwaukee CorrugatingCo. v. Flagge,' and which has been noted in
the prior discussion of that case. As early as Blossom v. Ludington,:5
under the original enactment as amended,5 6 an order requiring defendant to submit to oral interrogatories was by implication held appealable; likewise was an order refusing to strike defendant's answer
5
for his failure to attend upon the hearings'
But in Stuart v. Allen5 8
an order sustaining the commissioner's ruling that a question was irrelevant was held to be in effect a mere ruling on the relevancy and admissibility of certain evidence and neither an intermediate nor final
149155 Wis. 221, 144 N.W. 272 (1913).
150 170 Wis. 492, 175 N.W. 777 (1920).
151 Wis. STAT. (1935) §§ 260.02, 260.03.
T

152

171 Wis. 7, 176 N.W. 70 (1920).

153 265 N.W. 202 (Wis., 1936).

170 Wis. 492, 175 N.W. 777 (1920).
1-532 Wis. 212 (1873).
156 WIS. STAT. (1858)
c. 137, §§ 54, 55.
154

'57

First National Bank of Elkhorn v. Wood, 26 Wis. 500 (1870).

15845 Wis. 158 (1878).
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order and hence not appealable. The court intimated, however, that an
appeal might lie from a direction to answer by the lower court after
certification. An order directing the witness to answer and imposing
costs was held to be a final order and within Section 274.33, (2) [then
Section 3069 (2), Wisconsin Revised Statutes] in Cleveland, Ex'rs. v.
Burnhame59 and without the rule of Stuart v. Allen, supra, since it went
further and indemnified the party seeking the examination; likewise an
order striking an answer unless witness appeared within time limited,
and imposing costs, 6 0 and an order denying examination and imposing
costs. "' 1 An order denying certain questions as immaterial and irrelevant and imposing costs was held to be within the rule of Cleveland,
16 2

Ex'rs. v. Burnham.

0 3
,Orders limiting the scope of the examination after issue joined,
holding that an affidavit for examination of defendant was not in compliance with Chapter 321, Laws of 1885, amending Section 4096, Wisconsin Revised Statutes (1878),'4 refusing to allow an inspection of
books of account, 6 5 granting a motion to strike a claim in county court
for failure to appear, 6 6 denying a motion to suppress examination to
plead,' 6 7 requiring a nonresident defendant to submit to examination on
oral interrogatories,-"8 and striking an answer for failure to appear 6 9
were held to be appealable orders without questioning their effect under
Section 274.33, as it then existed. But in Knowles v. Rogers'" where,
as has been noticed, the proceedings were held to be a provisional
remedy, an order denying a motion to quash and limit the examination
was held not appealable under the statute. Then a similar order denying a motion to limit the subject of an examination and imposing costs,
was held not appealable; and the fact that costs were imposed did not
change its effect under the statute as it then existed."''

In Ellinger v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc." 2 where the proceeding

was held both a provisional remedy and a special proceeding, an order
denying and staying the examination was held to refuse the remedy
and to be a final order and appealable on both grounds. Following this
case appeals were allowed from an order reversing the court commis15960 Wis. 16, 17 N.W. 126, 18 N.W. 190 (1884).
160 Whereatt v. Allis, 65 Wis. 659, 27 N.W. 630 (1886).
-6 Schmidt v. Menasha V. W. Co., 92 Wis. 529, 66 N.W. 695 (1896).
162 Pride v. Weyenberg, 83 Wis. 59, 53 N.W. 29 (1892).
163 Kelly v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 60 Wis. 480, 19 N.W. 521 (1884).
164 Mygatt v. Burton, 74 Wis. 352, 43 N.W. 100 (1889).
165 Nichols v. McGeoch, 78 Wis. 360, 47 N.W. 372 (1890).
166 Frawley v. Cosgrove, 83 Wis. 441, 53 N.W. 689 (1892).
167 State v. Baetz, 86 Wis. 29, 56 N.W. 329 (1893).
168 Neeves v. Gregory, 86 Wis. 319, 56 N.W. 909 (1893).
169 Rogers v. Fate, 113 Wis. 364, 89 N.W. 186 (1902).
170 Knowles v. Rogers, 99 Wis. 231, 74 N.W. 813 (1898).
11 State, ex rel. Carpenter v. Mathys, 115 Wis. 31, 91 N.W. 114 (1902).
172 125 Wis. 643, 104 N.W. 811 (1905).
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sioner's ruling punishing a witness for contempt for refusal to answer,.1 3 an order denying a motion to strike pleadings,1 4 and an order
denying a stay of an adverse examination,' 1 5 without a discussion of
their appealability.
In Phipps v. Wisconsin Central Ry Co.176 on the other hand, on
appeal from an order requiring the production of records, it was held
to be a mere interlocutory order regulating the manner of procedure
and in no sense a final order within Section 274.33 (2) [then Section
3069 (2)] nor did it in a proper sense grant, refuse, continue or modify
a provisional remedy, citing the cases so holding, and stating that the
rule had been fully settled and was no longer open to doubt. Yet on
a second appeal in this case 1 7 an order requiring a witness to answer
and to submit to an examination and refusing to stay the examination
of other witnesses was held appealable under Section 274.33 (3) [then
Section 3069 (3)].
In Pfister v. McGovern 1s an appeal was allowed from an order
adjudging witnesses in contempt for refusal to answer. From the date
of the decision in the Phipps case, denying the right to appeal from
orders regulating the scope of the examination, until the case of Neacy
v. Thomas 9 which reiterated that rule on appeal from orders directing certain answers to be made and sustaining witness' refusal to answer others, the following appeals were allowed without discussion as
to the right under the statute. In Gratz v. Parker3 0 the appeal was
from an order which limited th scope of the examination but did not
deny the remedy entirely; in Hite v. Keene481 it required the submission to the examination; in Badger Brass Co. v. Daly 8 2 it denied the
,examination entirely, as it did in Ellinger v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc.; s s and in Heckendorn v. Romadka3 4 the appeal was from an
order denying the examination of a defendant.
Following the Neacy case several appeals were allowed from orders
requiring parties to submit to examination to enable the party taking
to plead." 5 In Karel v. Conlan 86 the case next following the decision
173 Schultz v. Strauss, 127 Wis. 325, 106 N.W. 1066 (1906).
14 Eastern Ry. of Minn. v. Tuteur, 127 Wis. 382, 105 N.W. 1067 (1906).
175 City of Madison v. Madison Gas & Electric Co, 129 Wis. 249 ,108 N.W. 65
(1906).
17, 130 Wis. 279, 110 N.W. 207 (1907).
V17 Phipps v. Wisconsin Central Ry. Co., 133 Wis. 153, 113 N.W. 456 (1907).
17a 132 Wis. 533, 111 N.W. 1135 (1907).
179 148 Wis. 91, 133 N.W. 580 (1912).
130 137 Wis. 104,118 N.W. 637 (1908).
'M' 137 Wis. 625, 119 N.W. 303 (1909).
%82
-137 Wis. 601, 119 N.W. 328 (1909).
183 138 Wis. 390, 120 N.W. 235 (1909).
18 138 Wis. 416, 120 N.W. 257 (1909).
15 American Food Products Co. v. American Milling Co., 151 Wis. 385, 138
N.W. 1123 (1912); Sullivan v. Ashland L. P. & St. Ry. Co., 152 Wis. 574,
140 N.W. 316 (1913).
186 155 Wis. 221, 144 N.W. 266 (1913).
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in the Neacy case in which the question of appealability was discussed,
on appeal from an order of the lower court affirming the ruling of the
court commissioner adjudicating the witness in contempt for refusal
to answer, the court held the order to be a final order in a special proceeding, nothing further remaining to be done, the guilt and punishment of the witness having been finally adjudicated. The court thus
distinguished it from the order in the Neacy case.'8 7 In Horlicks
Malted Milk Co. v. A. Spiegel Co.,'18 on plaintiff's witness' appeal
from an order punishing him for contempt for refusal to answer, it
was held appealable; while defendant's appeal from that part of the
order which denied it the right to certain answers was held not appealable. An order which in effect denied any examination at all was held
appealable in Kuryer Publishing Co. v. Messmer.1 9 Where the court
erroneously ordered the examination of a witness or party, appeals
were allowed, as in the case of a guardian ad litem'i' 0 privileged testimony,"" or where the proceeding was one in which the examination
could not be had'" ' or where there was no proper proceeding in which
such examination might be had.' 93 Orders striking pleadings have likewise been held appealable.9'
Finally in Milwaukee Corrugating Co. v. FlaggeI" an order denying a motion to suppress an examination to plead, on a motion to dismiss the appeal, was held not appealable. It was there declared that
upon filing the affidavit, the statute gave to the party seeking the examination a right to it independent of any action by the court. In refusing
to interfere with that right the court in no way affects it; and to speak
of such action as continuing the remedy is to transform a refusal to
act into affirmative action. This ruling then has the effect of putting
to end a great deal of litigation and simplifying procedure. Thus the
court overruled the line of cases commencing with Phipps v. Wisconsin
CentralRy. Co.'19 and ending with Sullivan v. Ashland L. P. & St. Ry.
Co.'1 97 In a vigorous dissent, Justice Eschweiler contended that the rule

181See also Cousins v. Schroeder, 169 Wis. 438, 172 N.W. 953 (1919); Markham
v. Hipke, 169 Wis. 37, 171 N.W. 300 (1907) ; McKoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v.
News Publishing Co., 174 Wis. 107, 182 N.W. 919 (1921); Singer Sewing
Machine Co. v. Lang, 186 Wis. 530, 203 N.W. 399 (1925) ; But see Landman
v. Rashman ,195 Wis. 33, 217 N.W. 649 (1928).
188 155 Wis. 201, 144 N.W. 272 (1913).
189 162 Wis. 565, 156 N.W. 948 (1916).
guardian ad litem v. Wright, 162 Wis. 580, 156 N.W. 955 (1916).
'9'0Rohleder,
19' State, ex rel. Schumacher v. Markham, 162 Wis. 55, 155 N.W. 917 (1916).
192 Bresadola v. Gogebic & Iron Counties R. & L. Co., 165 Wis. 109, 161 N.W.
362 (1917).
393 State v. T. M. E. R. & L. Co., 136 Wis. 179, 116 N.W. 900 (1908).
19tMaloney v. McCormich, 181 Wis. 107, 193 N.W. 966 (1923); Kentucky
Finance Co. v. Paramount Auto Exchange, 171 Wis. 586, 178 N.W. 9 (1920).
195 170 Wis. 492, 175 N.W. 777 (1916).
196133 Wis. 153, 113 N.W. 456 (1907).
197

152 Wis. 574, 140 N.W. 316 (1913).
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1936]

since the Phipps case had been acquiesced in by the legislature; and
for the court to thus overthrow such a well established rule would be
an usurpation of the functions of that body. Moreover it left one litigant with a right which was denied the other; and the right to protection from unwarranted examinations was fully as important as the
right to the examination. However, having become the rule, it found
quick observance in Mantz v. Schoen and Walter Co.""' The fact that
such an order is erroneous does not affect its appealability, for a ruling on the motion is merely an authoritative determination as to what
evidence may be elicited upon the examination. Suppressing nothing,
it prescribes the field in which the remedy may operate 90 As was
pointed out in the dissenting opinion in the Milwaukee Corrugating
case, orders denying the remedy were thereafter held appealable. 2°°
MISCELLANEOus RULINGS

It is discretionary with the trial court as to whether pleadings are to
be stricken for refusal to answer. 20

1

In Maloney v. McCormick20 2 the

court on appeal refused to consider the constitutionality of Section
4097 (1) [now Section 325.11], where defendant's answer was stricken
for refusal to testify on an adverse examination. Defendant's willful
failure to furnish data which it was required to produce pursuant to a
discovery examination necessary to enable plaintiff to plead does not
obviate the bar of Section 289.06 where the proper steps were not
taken to enlarge the time for filing the complaint, although the summons was served within time.20 3 The service of a summons, notice and
examination, subpoena and affidavit under the statute were held not
to be a compliance with Section 330.19 (5). The affidavit did not state
the "place" of the accident even if it were to be held in compliance
with the requirement of notice, which rule the court would not follow. 2° The appearance of an attorney at the examination on behalf of

his client was held not to constitute a general appearance so as to entitle him to notice of application for judgment. 05 The officer's charges
for taking a deposition were held properly taxable as costs in Aprin v.
20 6

Bowman.

108 171 Wis. 7, 176 N.W. 70 (1920).
'9 265 N.W. 202 (1936).
2o0 McKoosa-Edwards Paper Co. v. News Publishing Co., 174
N.W. 919 (1921) ; Stott v. Markle, 215 Wis. 528, 255 N.W. 540
201 Eastern Ry. of Minn. v. Tuteur, 127 Wis. 382, 105 N.W. 1067
202 181 Wis. 107, 193 N.W. 966 (1923).
203
Augustine v. Congregation of the Holy Rosary, 213 Wis. 517,
(1934).
204 Voss v. Tittel, 219 Wis. 175, 262 N.W. 579 (1935).
205 Velte v. Zeh, 188 Wis. 401, 206 N.W. 197 (1925).
2- 83 Wis. 54, 53 N.W. 151 (1892).

Wis. 107, 182
(1934).

(1906).

252 N.W. 271
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CONCLUSION

The preceding pages thus review the course of the decisions relating to the discovery statute, which at the present date is far different
in form, but, as shown, in effect provides that broad liberal remedy
which the legislature of 1858 sought to furnish. Many changes have
occurred in the context for the purpose of broadening the relief secured thereby but, in the attempted simplification of the statute by the
revision of 1927, the legislature removed therefrom one of the chief
sources of facts upon which the party seeking the examination to plead
might rely. And in the case of all statutory remedies, search should
first be made in the statute itself for authority rather than in the cases
interpreting it. In no stronger way could this be impressed than by the
action of the court in Stott v. Markle"7 where the court considered the
1927 revision.
In the future it would not be unwise to expect a continual shift and
change in the context of the enactment, not only by legislative amendments, as in the past, but by the supreme court under its rule making
power. Careful attention should be paid to these changes; but it should
not be forgotten that throughout the period of its existence on the
statute books of this state, the underlying spirit of the statute was to
give to a party a highly beneficent and remedial right to examine his
adversary under the conditions therein set forth, as to facts and evidence upon which such party might proceed to trial with knowledge of
the circumstances, surrounding his suit.
APPENDIX

Wis. REv. STAT. (1858) c. 137, §§
54, 55; Wis. REV. STAT. (1878) § 4096;
Wis. STAT. (1925) § 326.12.

NVIs. STAT. (1935) § 326.12. Discovery Examination Before Trials.

(1) Persons Subject Thereto. No action
to obtain a discovery under oath, in aid
of prosecution or defense of another
action shall be allowed*t [WIs. Rav.
STAT. (1858) c. 137, §§ 54, 55 denoted*
to Wis. STAT. (1925) § 326.12, denotedt; revision followed pursuant to
Wis. STAT. (1925) § 43.08, Wis. Laws
(1927) c. 523, § 49] ; but a party to an
action may be examined as a witness*
[dropped, Wis. REv. STAT. (1878) §
4096] but the examination oft [added,
Wis. REv. STAT. (1878) § 4096] a
[added, Wis. REv. STAT. (1878)
§

(1) Persons Subject Thereto. The adverse examination of a party or any
person for 'whose immediate benefit
any civil action or proceeding is prose-

4096; dropped, Wis. REV. STAT. (1898)
§ 4096] thet [added, Wis. REv. STAT.
(1898) § 4096] partyt [added, Wis.
REv. STAT. (1878) § 4096], his or its
assignort [added, Wis. Laws (1901) c.
207215

Wis. 528, 255 N.W. 540 (1934).

cuted or defended or (Supreme Court
Order, effective Jan. 1, 1934, 212 Wis.
XIV) his or its assignor, officer, agent

or employe, or of the person who was
such officer, agent or employe at the
time of the occurrence made the sub-

ject of the examination, may be taken
by deposition
adverse party
interrogatories
proceeding at
determination

at the instance of any
upon oral or written
in any civil action or
any time before final
thereof, but the depo-

nent shall not be compelled to disclose
anything not relevant to the controversy. (Supreme Court Order effec-

1936]
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244], officert [added, Wis. Laws
(1909) c. 84] agent, or employet
[added, Wis. Laws (1901) c. 244], or
in case a [added, Wis. Laws (1882)
c. 194; dropped, Wis. Laws (1909) c.
84] private [added, Wis. REv. STAT.
(1898) § 4096; dropped, Wis. Laws
(1909) c. 84] corporation be a party
[added, Wis. Laws (1882) c. 194;
dropped, Wis. Laws (1909) c. 84] in
addition to the foregoing [added, Wis.
Laws (1901) c. 244; dropped, Wis.
Laws (1909) c. 84] the examination of
the president; secretary [added, Wis.
Laws (1892) c. 194; dropped, Wis.
Laws (1909) c. 84] or [added, Wis.
REv. STAT. (1898) § 4096; dropped,
Wis. Laws (1909) c. 84] other principal officer [added, Wis. Laws (1882) c.
194; dropped, Wis. Laws (1909) c. 84]
or general managing agent [added,
Wis. Laws (1882) c. 194; dropped,
Wis. Laws (1901) c. 244] of such
corporation
[added,
Wis. Laws
(1882)
c.
194;
dropped, Wis.
Laws (1909) c. 84] or of the person
who was such president, secretary
[added, Wis. REv. STAT. (1898) §
4096; dropped, Wis. Laws (1909) c.
84], officert [added, Wis. REv. STAT.
(1898) § 4096], or [added, Wis. REv.
STAT. 1898) § 4096, dropped, Wis.
Laws (1901) c. 244] agentt [added,
Wis. REv.

STAT.

(1898)

§

4096], or

employet [added, Wis. Laws (1901) c.
244] at the time of the occurrence of
the facts made the subject of the examinationt [added, Wis. REv. STAT.
(1898) § 4096], or in case a county,
town or village, or city, be a party, the
examination of any officer of such
county, town, village, or cityt [added,
Wis. Laws (1909) c. 84] otherwise
than as a witness on a trial, may be
taken by deposition [added, Wis. REv.
STAT. (1878) § 4096] at the instance of
the adverse party*t or of anyone of
several adverse parties and for that
purpose may be compelled to give testimony in the action, in the same manner and subj ect to the same rules of
examination as any other witness.*
[dropped, Wis. REv. STAT. (1878) §
4096] [Concludes Wis. REV. STAT.
(1858) c. 137, § 54] in any action or
proceeding, at any time after the commencement thereof and before judgment.t [added, Wis. REv. STAT. (1878)
§ 4096] As many such examinations
may be had, at different times and
places, as there are individuals to be
examined; but no individual shall be
examined more than once, except as
hereinafter otherwise providedt [added, Wis. Laws (1909) c. 84].

tive Sept. 1, 1931, 204 Wis. IX.) Each
of said persons may be so examined
once and no more, except when examined before issue joined, in which
case he may be again examined after
issue joined, upon all the issues. If the
examination is taken after the complaint is served, but before issue is
joined, it may extend to all the allegations of the complaint.
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(2) Deposition. The examination provided for in the last section [Note
Wis. REv. STAT. (1858) c. 137, § 54],
may be had either on the trial of the
action, or at any time before trial, at
the option of the party claiming it,
before a judge of the court, or county
judge.* [dropped, Wis. REV. STAT.
(1878) § 4096] Such deposition shall
be taken before a judge at chambersf
[added, Wis. REV. STAT. (1878) §
4096] ort [added, Wis. Laws (1866)
c. 138] at [added, Wis. REV. STAT.
(1898) § 4096] court commissioned
[Wis. Laws (1886) c. 138] on a previous notice to*t the party to be examined* [dropped, Wis. REV. STAT.
(1878) § 4096] such partyt [added,
Wis. REv. STAT. (1878) § 4096] and
any other adverse party*t or their respective attorneyst [added, Wis. REV.
STAT. (1878) § 4096] of at least five
days*t unless for good cause shown,
the judge order otherwise.* [dropped,
Wis. REV. STAT. (1878) § 4096] or it
may be taken without the statet [added, Wis. REV. STAT. (1878) § 4096]
upon commission [added, Wis. REV.
STAT. (1878)
§ 4096; dropped, Wis.
Laws (1893) c. 141] in the manner
provided for taking other depostions.t
[added, Wis. REV. STAT. (1878) §
4096] Such portions of any such examination or examinations of any of
the persons mentioned as are relevant
to the issues in the case may be offered
by the party taking any such examination or examinations and shall be received upon the trial of the action or
proceeding in which it is taken, not-withstanding the person who was so
examined may be present at the trial
or proceedingt [added, Wis. Laws;
(1913) c. 246].

(2) Procedure. Same as for other
depositions. Exceptions. Except as
provided otherwise by this section,
such examination may be had within
or without the state, and may be instituted and conducted under and pursuant to the laws and rules regulating
the taking of other depositions for use
in actions or proceedings.

(3)

(3) Time, Place, Notice; Officers Empowered To Take. Such examination
when taken within the state,- shall be
taken before a judge at chambers or a
court commissioner on previous notice
to all adverse parties or their respective attorneys of at least five days. If
the person to be examined is a nonresident individual who is a party to
the action or proceeding, or is a nonresident president, secretary, treasurer
or managing agent of a foreign corporation that is a party to the action
the court may upon just terms fix the
time and place of such examination,
either within or without the state; and
such nonresident shall attend at such
time and place and submit to the examination, and if required, attend for

Subpoena. The party* [dropped,

Wis. REV. STAT. (1878)

[added, Wis. Laws
dropped, Wis. REV.

§ 4096] sought

(1863)
STAT.

c. 24;
(1878)

§

4096] to be examined may be compelled
to attend in the same manner as other
witnesses,* [dropped, Wis. REv. STAT.
(1878) § 4096] The attendance of the
party to be examinedt [added, Wis.
REv. STAT. (1878) § 4096], and the
production of all papers, books, files,
records, things, and matters in the
possession of such party, his or its
assignors, officers, agents, or employes,
relevant to the controversyt [added,
Wis. Laws (1907) c. 369], may be
compelled upon subpoena and the payment or tender of his fees as a witnesst [added, Wis. REV. STAT. (1878)
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§ 4096]. And the party so examined or
testifying, shall be entitled to demand
and receive the same fees for travel
and attendance as other witnesses
[added, Wis. Laws (1863) c. 24;
dropped, Wis. Ruv. STAT. (1878) §
4096]. If the party to be examined is a
non-resident of this state, the court
may upon motion fix the time and
place of such examination,t [added,
Wis. Laws (1909) c. 84], either within
or without the statet [added, Wis.
Laws (1919) c. 239]. He shall attend
at such time and place and submit to
the examination, and, if required, attend for the purpose of reading and
signing such deposition, without service of subpoenat [added, Wis. Laws
(1909) c. 84].

the reading and signing of such deposition, without service of subpoenas.
Such examination shall not be compelled in any county other than that
in which the persons examined resides,
except when a different county shall
be designated for the examination of
a nonresident, and except that any
nonresident subject to examination
may be examined in any county of this
state in which he is personally served
with notice and subpoena, and except
that the court inay fix another place
for such an examination in the case of
a resident who is physically wnable to
attend the examination in the county
of his residence. (Supreme Court Order, effective Jan. 1, 1934, 212 Wis.
XX.)

(4) Rules. [Note: Wis. Laws (1909)
c. 269 separated into paragraphs here.
Formerly "witness; and such"] Such
examination shall be subject to the
same rules as that of any other witness, but he shall not be compelled to
disclose anything not relevant to the
controversy.t [added, Wis. REv. STAT.
(1878) § 4096].

(4) Discovery Needed To Plead. If
discovery is sought, to enable the
plaintiff to frame a complaint, the notice of taking the examination shall
be accompanied by the affidavit of

(5) Notice. On motion and one day's
notice the court or presiding judge
thereof in which the action or proceeding is pending may, before the examination is begun by order limit the
subjects to which such examination
shall extend; but [added, Wis. REv.
STAT. (1878) § 4096; dropped, Wis.
Laws (1885) c. 321]. If such examination shall be taken before issue joined,
the notice of taking the same shall be
accompanied by an affidavit of the
party, his agent, or attorney, stating
the general nature and object of the
action, that discovery is sought to enable the party to plead and the points
upon which such discovery is desired,
and such examination shall be limited
to the discovery of the facts relevant
tot [added, Wis. Laws (1885) c. 321]
the [added, Wis. Laws (1885) c. 321;
dropped, Wis. REv. STAT. (1898) §
4096] sucht [added, Wis. REv. STAT.
(1898) § 4096] points, so stated [added, Wis. Laws (1885) c. 321; dropped,
Wis. REv. STAT. (1898) § 4096] un-

himself, his attorney or agent, stating

the general nature and object of the
action or proceeding, that discovery
is sought to enable him to plead, and
the subjects upon which information
is desired; and the examination relative thereto shall be permitted unless
the court or presiding judge thereof
shall, before the examination is begun
further limit the subjects to which it
shall extend, which may be done on
one day's notice.
(5) Use of Deposition. Such portions
of any such deposition as are relevant
to the issues may be offered by the
party taking the same, and shall be
received when so- offered upon the
trial of action or proceeding in which
it is taken, notwithstanding the deponent may be present.
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less the court or the presiding judge
thereof, on motion and one day's notice, shall, before the examination is
begun, by order, further limit the subjects to whicht [added, Wis. Laws
(1885) c. 321] such examination shall
extend [added, Wis. Laws (1885) c.
321; dropped, Wis. Rav. STAT. (1898)
§ 4096] it shall extendf [added,
Wis. RiEv. STAT. (1898)
§ 4096]
butt
[added, Wis. Laws
(1909)
c. 84] should the defendant desire an examination of the plaintiff,
his or its agent, employe, or officer,
before issue joined, said defendant
shall be entitled to examine said plaintiff [added, Wis. Laws (1909) c. 84;
dropped Wis. Laws (1917) c. 101]
after service of the complaint the defendant may examine the plaintiff -his
or its agent, employe, or officer, and
the plaintiff may examine the defendant, his or itst [added, Wis. Laws
(1917) c. 1011 agent, employe or officer, on all points set out in the complaint, as though the same had been
put in issuet [added, Wis. Laws
(1909) c. 84]; but such examination
shall not preclude the right to another
examination after issue joined upon
all the issues in the cause, andf [added, Wis. Laws (1885) c. 321] the party
examining shall in all cases bet [add-

ed, Wis.

REv. STAT.

(1878)

§ 4096]

permitted [added, Wis. R~v.
(1878) § 4096; dropped, Wis.
(1882) c. 194] allowedt [added,
Laws (1882) c. 194] to examine
oral interrogatories.t [added,
REV. STAT. (1878) § 4096]

STAT.

Laws
Wis.
upon
Wis.

(6) Venue. But the party to be examined shall not be compelled to attend in any other county than that of
his residence, or where he may be
served with a summons for his attendance.* [dropped, Wis. Laws (1863) c.
24]. Such examinations shall not be
compelled in any other county than
that in which the party to be examined residest [added, Wis. R-v. STAT.
(1878) § 4096], except as hereinbefore
providedf [added, Wis. Laws (1909)
c. 84]; when such adverse party is not
a resident of this state, his testimony
may be taken upon commission, in the
same manner as provided by law, and
by the rules of court, for taking of
the testimony of other witnesses upon
commission.* [Wis. REV. STAT. (1858)
C. 137, § 56; dropped, Wis. REv. STAT.
(1878) § 4096] provided*f howevert
[added, Wis. Laws (1909) c. 84], that
whenevert [added, Wis. Laws (1889)

(6) Deposition Following Examination. At the conclusion of the adverse
examination the deposition of the "witness may be taken without previous
notice and before the same officer by
any party, and the satne may be used
in like cases and with like effect as if
taken upon notice. (Supreme Court
Order, effective Jan. 1, 1934, 212 Wis.
XX.)
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c. 348] any [added, Wis. Laws (1889)
c. 348; dropped, Wis. Laws (1893) c.
141] plaintiff or defendant is a nonresident of this state his deposition
may be had under the provisions of
this section int [added, Wis. Laws
(1889) c. 348] the [added, Wis. Laws
(1889) c. 348; dropped, Wis. Laws
(1911) c. 231] anyt [added, Wis. Laws
(1911) c. 231] county int [added, Wis.
Laws (1889) c. 321] which the action
is pending [added, Wis. Laws (1889)
c. 321; dropped, Wis. Laws (1911) c.
231] the statet [added, Wis. Laws
(1911) c. 231] if he can be personally
served with notice and subpoena?
[added, Wis. Laws (1889) c. 321] in
such county [added, Wis. Laws (1889)
c. 321; dropped, Wis. Laws (1911) c.
231].
(7) Foreign corporation. In case a
foreign corporation is a party the examination of its president, secretary,
other principal officer, assignor or
agent or employe, or the person who
was such, or either of them, at the
time of the occurrence of the facts
made the subject of the examination,
may be had under the provisions of
this section int [added, Wis. Laws
(1901) c. 244] any county oft [added,
Wis. Laws (1911) c. 231] this statet
[added, Wis. Laws (1901) c. 244] in
the county in which the action may be
pending or in which it was originally
brought, if such officer or agent can
there be personally served with notice
for taking such deposition and a subpoena to attend such examination,
[added, Wis. Laws (1901) c. 244;
dropped, Wis. Laws (1911) c. 231].

The court may also, upon motion and
such terms as may be just, fix a time
and place in this state for such examination of any of said persons. Such
persons so sought to be examined as
aforesaid shall attend at such time
and place and submit to the examination, and then and there have with him
all papers, books, files, records, things,
and matters in the possession of such
person by reason of his relation to
such corporation, relevant to the controversy. Such person sought to be examined as aforesaid shall attend at
such time and place and submit to the
examination, and, if required, attend
for the purpose of reading and signing
such deposition without service of subpoena.t [added, Wis. Laws (1911) c.
231].

(8) Contempt. In any examination
undert [added, Wis. Laws (1889) c.
321] the [added, Wis. Laws (1889) c.
321; dropped, Wis. Ruv. STAT. (1898)
§ 4096] theset [added, Wis. REv. STAT.
(1898) § 4096] provisions of this section [added, Wis Laws (1889) c. 321;
dropped, Wis. REv. STAT. (1898) §
4096] the judge or commissioner before whom the same is hadt [added,
Wis. Laws (1889) c. 321] shall have
power and authority to [added, Wis.
Laws (1889) c. 321; dropped, Wis.
REv. STAT. (1898) § 4096] mayt [added, Wis. REv. STAT. (1898) § 4096]
compel the party examined to answer
all questions relevant to the issues involved and alsot [added, Wis. Laws
(1889) c. 321] to [added, Wis. Laws

c. 321; dropped, Wis. REV.
(1898) § 4096] compel the production byt [added, Wis. Laws (1889)
c. 321] the party examined [added,
Wis. Laws (1889) c. 321; dropped,
Wis. RFv. STAT. (1898) § 4096] himt
[added, Wis. Laws (1889) c. 321] of
books and papers relevant and pertinent to the issues and may enforce
such answers and the production of
such books and papers by contempt
proceedingst [added, Wis. Laws (1889)
c. 321]; such deposition when completed, need not be read to or by or
be subscribed by the party examined.
[added, Wis. REv. STAT. (1898) §
4096; dropped, Wis. Laws (1899) c.
29].

(1889)

STAT.
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(9)
Stipulation Waiving Reading
and Signing. Whenever a party shall
be examined and his deposition taken
under the provisions of this section
the party taking such examination and
the party examined, or their counsel,
may stipulate upon the record before
the judge or court commissioner before whom the examination is had,
that the reading of the deposition to
or by the deponent and his signature
thereto are waived by consent, and

that the deposition may be used with
the same force and effect as if read
over and signed; and in cases where
such stipulation is made the said examination or deposition may be used
in the action in which the same is
taken and in any other action or proceeding in that or in any other court
where it could have been used if read
over and signed, with the same force
and effect in all respects as if the deponent had read and signed the same.

(10) Signing; Transmittal. In all cases
where the reading and signature shall
not be waived as aforesaid, the said
deposition shall be read over to or by
the deponent and signed by him before
the officer before whom the same was
taken, and the attendance of the party
examined for the purpose of reading
and signing said deposition may be
compelled in the same manner as his
attendance for the purpose of submitting to such examination may be compelled by lawt [added, Wis. Laws
(1899) c. 29]. [Wis. Laws (1907) c.
369 changed "law, it" to present
form] and the examination shall be
taken and filed by the judge,* [dropped,

Wis.

REv. STAT.

(1878)

§ 4096] or

court commissioner [added, Wis. Laws
(1866) c. 138; dropped, Wis. REV.
§ 4096] in like manner,
STAT. (1878)
and may be read by either party on
the trial* [dropped, Wis. REv. STAT.
(1878) § 4096]. It shall in all cases be
delivered or transmitted by the officer
before whom taken to the clerk of the
court, magistrate or other person before whom the action or proceeding is
pending securely sealed, and shall remain sealed until opened by the court
or clerk thereof or such magistrate or
other persont [added, Wis. Laws
(1899) c. 29].

